We show that every N -player K 1 × · · · × K N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least
We refer to these
The notion of correlated equilibrium was introduced by Aumann [2] as a rich generalization of Nash equilibrium. The set C ⊂ ∆(S) of correlated equilibria is a nonempty convex polytope defined by the incentive constraints, as well as the nonnegativity constraints, p(s) ≥ 0, s ∈ S, and the constraint s∈S p(s) = 1, the latter two guaranteeing p ∈ ∆(S). Recall that a correlated equilibrium that is a product measure is also a Nash equilibrium.
The purpose of this note is to point out that games with many players have sparsely supported correlated equilibria. More precisely, the main result is the following.
To better understand the result, consider an N -player 2 × · · · × 2 game. The result also has implications for the (non)existence of games with unique fully supported correlated equilibria. To see this, notice that, for any N ≥ 3 and K ≥ 2, we have
which means that, for N ≥ 3, there always exists a correlated equilibrium with at least one zero entry and which cannot be fully supported.
This is to be contrasted with Nitzan [4] , who shows that the set of two- but that such games simply cannot exist in these "remaining" cases.
Finally, recall that if an N -player game has a unique correlated equilibrium, then it must also be a Nash equilibrium and hence a product measure.
For simplicity, consider again 2 × · · · × 2 games. The correlated equilibrium has at least 2 N − 1 − 2N zero entries and thus at most 2N + 1 atoms, and, since it is a product measure, there are at most log 2 (2N + 1) non-degenerate marginal distributions. This implies the following fact suggesting that large games with a unique correlated equilibrium must be quite "degenerate" in some sense. 
The proof
To simplify notation,
, and assume, without loss of generality, d > m. We identify a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(S) over the set of pure strategy profiles with a (d +
Fix q 0 ∈ C, which exists since C is nonempty, (e.g., Aumann [2] , Hart and Schmeidler [3] ), and consider the affine subspace,
By the dimension theorem, (e.g., Artin ∈ C with at least one additional entry equal to zero, thus n +1 > n . Therefore, there exists ≤ d − m, such that repeating the procedure times, eventually yields an affine space H of dimension greater or equal to zero, and a point q satisfying at least d − m nonnegativity constraints with equality, the constraint d+1 j=1 p j = 1, as well as all the incentive constraints defining C. In other words, it eventually yields a point p = q ∈ C with at least d − m zero entries, which completes the proof.
